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Multifunctionality, Agricultural
Policy, and Environmental Policy
David Abler
In addition to supplying food and fiber, agriculture is a source of public goods and externalities. This
article addresses two questions. First, do price and income support policies promote a multifunctional
agriculture in an effective manner? Second, would policies targeted more directly at multifunctional
attributes be more efficient than price and income support policies? The answer to the first question
is no, at least for policies targeted at outputs (price supports, export subsidies, etc.). Public goods are
not directly linked to production, but rather to land use and agricultural structures. Evidence in
response to the second question is sketchier with respect to policies targeted at land.
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The primary function of agriculture is to supply
food, fiber, and industrial products. However, agri-
culture can also be a source of several public goods
and externalities. Rural and urban populations often
value agricultural land as open space and as a source
of countryside amenities. Agricultural land is
frequently a habitat for wildlife species. The
agricultural sector can contribute to the economic
viability of many rural areas and to food security.
On the other hand, conversion of forest and wet-
lands to agricultural production can damage eco-
systems. Agricultural nutrients, pesticides, patho-
gens, salts, and eroded soils are leading causes of
water quality problems in many countries. Water
used for irrigation in agriculture is water unavailable
to nonagricultural sectors or ecosystems. There is
concern about the negative effects of livestock pro-
duction on animal welfare. On either the positive or
negative side, agriculture can be both a sink and a
source for greenhouse gases.
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The term multifunctionality refers to the fact that
an activity can have multiple outputs and therefore
may contribute to several objectives at once. As
applied to agriculture, the term first came into use
in the late 1990s in the European Union for, it is
often argued, protectionist reasons (Bohman et al.,
1999; Swinbank, 2001). Some governments have
attempted to justify agricultural price and income
support programs and trade restrictions as a means
of preserving the multifunctional attributes of their
countries’ agriculture. This has led to friction among
member governments at the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) negotiations and in the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). However, the attention given to multi-
functionality has also opened up a research agenda
for agricultural and resource economists (OECD,
2001a; Batie, 2003), and provided a new outlet for
existing lines of research on topics such as country-
side amenities, agricultural land preservation, and
rural economic development.
This paper is motivated by two questions. First,
do agricultural price and income support policies
promote a multifunctional agriculture in an effective
manner? Second, would policies targeted more di-
rectly at multifunctional attributes be more efficient
than traditional price and income support policies?
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Toward this end, the current state of the literature is
assessed on two topics: (a) jointness between agri-
cultural commodity production and production of
multifunctional attributes, and (b) transaction costs
in agricultural and environmental policy design and
administration.
Multifunctional Attributes of Agriculture
Agriculture globally is a source of a number of pub-
lic goods and externalities (Abler, 2001a,b; Shortle,
Abler, and Ribaudo, 2001; OECD, 2001a,b; Bland-
ford, Boisvert, and Fulponi, 2003). Table 1 provides
a listing of public goods that have been often men-
tioned as multifunctional attributes of agriculture,
along with several negative externalities identified
in the literature.
Agriculture is a major user of land in most
countries, and rural landscapes are often defined by
agricultural structures, cropping patterns, the pres-
ence of livestock, and the presence of wildlife in
agricultural areas. Related to landscape amenities
are open-space amenities. Farmland, forests, wet-
lands, parks, wildlife refuges, golf courses, undevel-
oped vacant lots, and even cemeteries fall into the
general category of open space. There has been
concern in many countries about conversion of
agricultural land to urban uses and agricultural land
abandonment, and how the loss of agricultural land
might change the character of rural landscapes.
Landscape and open-space amenities are perhaps
the most frequently mentioned multifunctional attri-
butes for agriculture. These terms are sometimes
used in a broad sense to encompass several of the
other public goods listed in table 1 (e.g., Hellerstein
et al., 2002). As used here, they refer in the
narrower sense to the aesthetic value of scenic
vistas and the enjoyment or tranquility derived from
using or being near open areas. They include utility
derived from recreational activities in open areas
(hunting, fishing, camping, swimming, hiking, bird
watching, etc.), which are public goods insofar as
these activities are not subject to exclusion or
congestion effects. There may also be beneficial
externalities that do not rise to the level of a pure
public good—for example, open space may increase
property values on adjacent parcels of land (Geog-
hegan, Lynch, and Bucholtz, 2003).
With respect to cultural heritage, farmers and
others in rural areas are often viewed as preservers
of cultural values which have been lost in urban
areas. For many people, agriculture also provides a
link to the past when their ancestors lived on farms.
Table 1. Public Goods and Negative Externalities
from Agriculture
Public Goods Negative Externalities
Landscape&open-space amenities Eutrophication
Cultural heritage Sedimentation & turbidity
Rural economic viability Drinking water contamination
Domestic food security Odors from livestock operations
Prevention of natural hazards Animal welfare
Groundwater resource recharge Irrigation–overuse, salinization
Preservation of biodiversity Loss of biodiversity
Greenhouse gas sinks Greenhouse gas emissions
As George (1997) cautions, public opinions about
farming tend to be nostalgic and do not reflect the
reality in rural areas today. Technological, economic,
and social changes have had profound impacts in
both urban and rural areas. Nevertheless, the preser-
vation of cultural heritage is often cited as one
multifunctional attribute of agriculture.
The economic viability of rural areas is a concern
in most developed countries. Rapid technological
progress in agriculture over the last century has
made it possible for a small percentage of the labor
force to produce ample food supplies at prices that
are significantly lower, in inflation-adjusted terms,
than they were 50 or 100 years ago. Rural popula-
tions in many regions of the United States and other
countries have fallen significantly in recent decades.
However, whether the economic viability of rural
areas is in fact a public good is open to debate. The
question is essentially whether rural areas have an
economic value above and beyond their value added
in the goods and services they produce.
One economic argument sometimes made is that
market distortions can cause the social opportunity
cost of labor in rural areas to be lower than market
wage rates, and therefore calculations of the eco-
nomic contribution of rural areas based on market
wages understate that contribution. As Horbulyk
(2001) emphasizes, however, economists view
employment as a social cost, not a social benefit.
From an economic perspective, employment gives
rise to social benefits only in proportion to the value
of goods and services produced by workers.
Food security is often defined as regular access
(either through production or purchasing power) to
enough food for a healthy and productive life. Yet,
when used in the context of multifunctionality, food
security has usually been defined in terms of
national security, i.e., access to a sufficient amount
of food in national or international crises. The argu-
ment is that domestic food production can help10   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
ensure against disruptions in imports caused by
war, blockades, or other international events.
In terms of natural hazards prevention, irrigated
rice production in Japan and South Korea is some-
times cited as a form of flood prevention, because
irrigated paddy fields can store water during the
rainy season. In this respect, irrigated paddy fields
serve one of the functions often ascribed to wet-
lands. In mountainous countries, agricultural vegeta-
tion on hillsides and alpine pastures is sometimes
mentioned as a form of protection against land-
slides and avalanches. With respect to groundwater
resources, seepage from irrigation systems has been
cited as a mechanism for groundwater resource re-
charge. On the other hand, irrigation in many areas
suffers from overuse of scarce water, salinization,
and waterlogging.
Agricultural production can have profound im-
pacts on biodiversity, both for better and for worse
(van Dijk, 2001). Agriculture replaces a natural
ecosystem—which might be a forest, prairie, desert,
wetlands, coastal area, or some other system,
depending on the location—with a human-managed
ecosystem. Species of flora and fauna having a
comparative advantage under the natural ecosystem
will decline or become extinct in that area, while
species having a comparative advantage under the
human-managed ecosystem will prosper. Similarly,
agriculture can be both a sink and a source for
greenhouse gases (Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change, 2001).
Other negative externalities from agricultural
production include eutrophication of surface waters
from excess nutrients in fertilizers and animal
wastes, sedimentation and turbidity in surface waters
due to soil erosion, drinking water contamination
from pesticides, fertilizers, and animal wastes, odors
from livestock, and—to many people—problems of
animal welfare, particularly in intensive livestock
operations (Shortle, Abler, and Ribaudo, 2001;
Blandford, Boisvert, and Fulponi, 2003).
In any analysis of agricultural/environmental pol-
icy and multifunctionality, it is essential to consider
not only public goods and beneficial externalities
associated with agriculture, but also negative exter-
nalities. Some proponents of multifunctionality
have emphasized only public goods and beneficial
externalities while downplaying negative external-
ities (Abler, 2001b). Failure to consider both positive
and negative external effects can lead to erroneous
policy conclusions. Policies adopted to promote
public goods could worsen, or at least fail to
improve, negative externalities. Peterson, Boisvert,
and de Gorter (2002) illustrate this point using a
simulation model with two externalities (landscape
amenities, human health costs from agricultural
chemicals) and two policies (land subsidy/tax,
chemical tax).
The Question of Jointness
The most important issue on the production side of
multifunctionality concerns the nature and degree
of jointness between the production of crop and
livestock products, on the one hand, and production
of multifunctional attributes on the other hand
(OECD, 2001a). If there were no jointness, multi-
functional attributes could be provided indepen-
dently of agricultural commodities and there would
be no case for agricultural price and income support
programs as a mechanism for promoting multi-
functionality.
In general, jointness can arise due to either tech-
nical interdependencies in production or economic
interdependencies (OECD, 2001a; Burrell, 2001).
Technical interdependencies refer to inherent fea-
tures of the production process governed by biologi-
cal, chemical, and physical relationships. Economic
interdependencies refer to linkages created by non-
allocable inputs or linkages created by allocable
fixed or quasi-fixed inputs.
A nonallocable input contributes to multiple out-
puts simultaneously, so that it is nonrival for one
output when used to produce another. If a non-
allocable input is used in the production of an
agricultural commodity and also in the production
of a public good, a change in the commodity output
will lead to a change in the nonallocable input, and
in turn the supply of the public good. An allocable
fixed or quasi-fixed input is available to a producer
in a fixed amount or along an upward-sloping supply
curve, whereby a change in one output leads to a
change in the amount of the input allocated to that
output, and in turn the amount of the input re-
maining for other outputs. If different commodities
are associated with different levels of public goods,
then reallocation of fixed or quasi-fixed inputs
among these products will alter the supply of public
goods from agriculture.
The case for technical interdependencies in
agriculture is strongest for negative externalities.
Problems such as soil erosion, nutrient runoff and
leaching, and methane from livestock manure are
all governed by biophysical processes, although
they can be mitigated using alternative production
or abatement technologies.Abler Multifunctionality, Agricultural Policy, and Environmental Policy   11
The case for technical interdependencies for the
public goods listed in table 1 is much weaker. One
could argue that flood prevention and groundwater
resource recharge are inherent features of irrigated
agricultural production, at least in some areas. How-
ever, technical linkages with production could be
weakened or broken because they depend on crop-
land being irrigated and not on the amount of a crop
harvested, or even (within the class of irrigated
crops) on the choice of crop itself. Replacing agri-
cultural land with wetlands would also be an option
for flood control.
Similarly, landscape and open-space amenities
are not related to commodity production per se, but
rather to land use practices and agricultural struc-
tures (Abler, 2001b). Agricultural structures that
are important vary by location and include barns,
stonewalls, hedges, roads, ponds, irrigation canals,
and watercourses surrounding agricultural fields to
capture runoff. It would be possible to conserve tra-
ditional agricultural structures—which often serve
to remind people of agriculture—even if they no
longer have any agricultural value. Within a given
area, a broad mix of agricultural land uses and other
types of open space appears to generate more amen-
ities compared to a single land use (Kline and
Wichelns, 1998).
The case for economic interdependencies for the
public goods in table 1 is stronger. In the production
of landscape and open-space amenities, agricultural
land and structures are essentially nonallocable
inputs that contribute to commodity production and
can also contribute to these public goods. By the
same token, agricultural land can simultaneously
contribute to commodity production and the preven-
tion of natural hazards, though as noted above, this
is not a case of technical interdependence. Agri-
cultural land, traditional structures, and farm house-
hold labor may also contribute to the preservation
of cultural heritage. Of course, among comparisons
of one agricultural commodity versus another, farm
household labor, land, and structures are usually
allocable and generally behave like fixed or quasi-
fixed inputs.
Jointness between public goods and agricultural
land and structures does not necessarily imply joint-
ness between public goods and agricultural output.
Econometric evidence reveals the elasticity of supply
of land to agriculture as a whole is very low, and
elasticities of supply to individual crops and live-
stock products are also relatively low (Abler, 2001c;
Salhofer, 2001). At the same time, elasticities of
substitution between land and purchased inputs,
particularly fertilizer, are relatively high (Abler,
2001c; Salhofer, 2001). The result is that changes
in agricultural output are accomplished primarily
through changes in purchased inputs rather than
changes in land. Indeed, agricultural output has
grown in virtually all states in the U.S. since 1960,
and grown substantially in many states, despite a de-
cline in agricultural land in every single state (Ball,
Butault, and Nehring, 2001).
Structural changes in agriculture in recent years
appear to have reduced landscape and open-space
amenities generated by agriculture. Growth in
intensive livestock operations has led to concerns in
many communities about surface water and ground-
water pollution from animal wastes, as well as
odors, especially from hog operations (McBride
and Key, 2003; National Research Council, 2003).
A 1998 survey of farmers in urbanizing areas of
Pennsylvania, conducted by Larson, Findeis, and
Smith (2001), found 44% had received complaints
in the past few years about agricultural practices,
particularly odors. A 2001 U.S. nationwide survey
by Esseks and Kraft (2002) found significant
support for farmland protection among urban and
suburban respondents, but also significant concern
among these respondents about contamination of
drinking water from pesticides and livestock manure.
These findings suggest landscape and open-space
amenities in urban and suburban areas are reduced
by the presence of nearby intensive livestock oper-
ations.
One question that arises with regard to agricul-
tural price and income support programs is whether
land would remain in agriculture following a
decrease in production of agricultural commodities
or a decrease in commodity prices. A study of farm-
land conversion in the Mid-Atlantic region by Lynch
and Carpenter (2003) yielded inconsistent results
for 1978S1997 on the role of farm prices and costs
in farmland conversion. Population density had a
positive and significant impact on conversion.
Hardie, Narayan, and Gardner (2001) found farm-
land prices in the Mid-Atlantic region were deter-
mined primarily by nonfarm factors such as average
household income and population density, rather
than farm-related factors such as net farm returns.
In the European Union, there are concerns that
significant cuts in agricultural price supports could
lead to widespread agricultural land abandonment
or conversion to urban uses (Burrell, 2001; Dobbs
and Pretty, 2001). The presumption would appear
to be that while the elasticity of supply of land to
agriculture is currently low, the land supply curve12   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
has a more elastic portion which would become evi-
dent as cuts in agricultural prices shifted the demand
for land inward. The experiment has not been run,
so we do not know whether this presumption is
correct.
Following a sudden and near-complete end to
agricultural subsidies in the 1980s, New Zealand
experienced only a slight decline in agricultural
land as marginal lands were converted to forestry or
reverted to native bush, and a diversification of com-
modities produced on agricultural land (Federated
Farmers of New Zealand, 2002). The degree to
which the New Zealand experience is relevant to
the European Union or United States is unknown.
Proponents of food security as a multifunctional
attribute assert that agricultural production is linked
to food security because current production helps
ensure the availability of a sufficient quantity of
land for domestic production should a crisis disrupt
imports (Abler, 2001b). However, the same events
likely to impair access to imported food would
probably also impair access to imported agricultural
inputs used in domestic production (OECD, 2001a).
Critical inputs largely imported by many countries
include fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, oil, machinery,
machinery parts, and livestock feed.
In addition, food security does not necessarily
imply a continuation of current land usage patterns.
Allowing for cutbacks in food consumption toward
survival levels and substitution among foods pro-
duced and consumed could significantly reduce land
usage below current levels (Brunstad, Gaasland,
and Vårdal, 2001). Public stockholding of agricul-
tural commodities is also an option for ensuring the
availability of food during a crisis (OECD, 2001a).
Among the public goods listed in table 1, the case
for economic interdependencies with agricultural
production is weakest for rural economic viability.
Agriculture in developed countries represents only
a small percentage of the rural economy, and is be-
coming smaller. Farms currently account for only 5%
of the rural U.S. population (U.S. Census Bureau,
2002), and farm income accounts for only 4% of
total personal income in nonmetropolitan U.S. coun-
ties (Kassel and Carlin, 2000). The rural nonfarm
share of the U.S. population has been relatively
constant since 1900 in spite of a major decrease in
farming’s share of the U.S. population (Gale,
2000).
If agriculture had been a linchpin of the rural
economy, the rural nonfarm share of the population
should have declined as a result of decline in the
farm share of the population. Even in the short run,
adverse conditions in agriculture need not threaten
the economic health of rural areas, provided other
conditions are favorable. For example, the unem-
ployment rate in rural areas of the United States
declined substantially in the second half of the
1990s, as rural areas joined in the U.S. economic
boom. This occurred even as agricultural prices were
falling significantly (Gale, 2000). Agriculture’s
contribution to the economic viability of rural areas




Transaction costs have been defined broadly as “the
economic equivalent of friction in physical systems”
(Williamson, 1985). Within this broad definition,
transaction costs include all costs of acquiring infor-
mation, making decisions, reaching agreements, and
administering agreements once reached. Although
transaction costs have usually been applied to private
decision making, they are increasingly being applied
to governmental decisions (e.g., Carpentier, Bosch,
and Batie, 1998; Falconer, Dupraz, and Whitby,
2001; Falconer and Whitby, 1999; McCann and
Easter, 2000; Vatn, 2002).
OECD (2001c) gives the transaction costs
example of a targeted direct payment to farmers, in
which case there are costs to the government of
designing the policy, obtaining legislative and exec-
utive approval, establishing selection criteria for
which farmers will receive payments, establishing
criteria for what farmers must do to obtain payments,
determining payment levels, disbursing payments,
monitoring and auditing payments, and evaluating
policy outcomes. To these transaction costs should
be added the costs to farmers of learning about the
policy, deciding whether to apply for payments, the
application process, depositing payments, and com-
plying with audits and other reporting requirements.
When disputes arise, there may also be costs of
arbitration or litigation that should be counted as
part of transaction costs.
Policy-related transaction costs are important to
multifunctionality for two reasons. First, it may be
possible to economize on transaction costs by using
one policy instrument to achieve multiple objec-
tives. Tinbergen’s (1952) well-known maxim—at
least as many policy instruments are required as
there are policy objectives—need not hold in a world
with policy-related transaction costs. Agriculture
has a wide variety of multifunctional attributes andAbler Multifunctionality, Agricultural Policy, and Environmental Policy   13
it may or may not be efficient to have a separate
policy for each of them.
Second, different policy instruments can carry
different transaction costs. As argued by Vatn
(2002), the transaction costs of targeted agri-
environmental policies may be so high that agricul-
tural price and income support policies, including
policies which restrict international trade, may be
the most efficient option for promoting multi-
functional attributes. In contrast, in a model with no
transaction costs, trade barriers never lead to a social
optimum, even in the presence of multifunctionality
(Paarlberg, Bredahl, and Lee, 2002).
Estimates of administrative costs for agricultural
programs suggest significant differences across
programs. Administrative costs are available from
public budgets; estimates of other types of trans-
action costs are more difficult to derive and tend to
be rare. Traditional price and income support pro-
grams carry administrative costs generally ranging
between 1% and 5% of total program costs to the
government (Falconer and Whitby, 1999; Vatn,
2002). By contrast, administrative costs for agri-
environmental programs in the United States and
Europe range from about 5% of total government
costs to nearly 50% (Falconer, Dupraz, and Whitby,
2001; Falconer and Whitby, 1999; McCann and
Easter, 2000; Vatn, 2002). It is relatively easy to
transfer funds to farmers based on acreage or pro-
duction, but more difficult to ensure that environ-
mental or land management conditions are followed
in return (Falconer and Whitby, 1999).
In the United States, agri-environmental programs
include the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP),
Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), Environmental
Quality Incentive Program (EQIP), conservation
compliance requirements for farm commodity pro-
grams, and federal, state, and local farmland preser-
vation programs (Ribaudo, 2001; Hellerstein et al.,
2002).
In the European Union, there are hundreds of
agri-environmental programs at various levels of
government. These programs are usually voluntary
and generally compensate farmers for following
certain management practices (Gatto and Merlo,
1999; Hanley, 2001). The majority of these pro-
grams have more than one objective, with the most
frequently occurring objectives being reduction of
negative externalities from agriculture, wildlife con-
servation, and landscape conservation (Gatto and
Merlo, 1999).
One reason why agri-environmental programs
carry relatively high administrative costs may be
that most of these programs have been relatively
small in scale to date, covering fewer farms than the
number covered by price and income support pro-
grams. Consequently, fixed administrative costs for
agri-environmental programs (costs independent of
the number of farms covered) are relatively large
when expressed on a per farm basis.
In their study of administrative costs for Envi-
ronmentally Sensitive Areas (ESAs) in the United
Kingdom, Falconer, Dupraz, and Whitby (2001)
found economies of scale with respect to the number
of agreements made with farmers in any one ESA.
They also observed significant learning-by-doing
effects, with administrative costs falling as the num-
ber of years of experience in managing agreements
increased.
Targeted agri-environmental programs can have
the advantage of incurring transaction costs for only
those farms where public goods or negative exter-
nalities are most important. There is significant
spatial variability in agricultural landscapes, the
economic contribution of agriculture to rural areas,
natural hazards, biodiversity, and nonpoint agricul-
tural pollution (Abler, 2001b). Agricultural price
and income support programs incur transaction
costs for all farms producing commodities covered
by the programs, regardless of whether or not they
are located in areas where multifunctional attributes
are important.
Based on the findings of Carpentier, Bosch, and
Batie (1998), targeting nitrogen runoff performance
standards toward farms most responsible for runoff
would increase transaction costs per farm covered
under the standards, but would reduce total trans-
action costs because fewer farms would be covered.
Their findings also suggest targeting would reduce
total program costs (transaction costs plus compli-
ance costs).
Related to the above discussion is the potential
for geographic mismatches between farm program
benefits and multifunctional attributes. U.S. farm
program benefits are geographically concentrated in
the Corn Belt and Great Plains (Gunderson et al.,
2000). In the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast, where
there are significant concerns about loss of agricul-
tural land to housing and urban uses, farm program
benefits are comparatively small. Similar geo-
graphic mismatches occur in the European Union
(Hofreither, 2002; Potter, 2002).
The transaction cost issue is mainly applicable to
public goods positively associated with land,
structures, or other agricultural inputs. For dealing
with negative externalities, there are unlikely to be14   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
any transaction cost savings with price and income
support programs because these programs generally
worsen negative externalities. Price and income
support programs have been widely identified as
a contributor to nonpoint agricultural pollution
through effects on the scale of production, input
usage, and farm structure (Shortle, Abler, and
Ribaudo, 2001; OECD, 1998).
These programs tend to encourage farmers to pro-
duce on environmentally sensitive lands and make
more intensive use of environmentally harmful
inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation water, and
fossil fuels). Agricultural policies designed to
increase livestock production also imply an increase
in livestock wastes. One might think that supply
controls such as production quotas or acreage
restrictions would be environmentally beneficial
because they reduce output, but this is not neces-
sarily the case. Acreage restrictions may lead to
substitution of environmentally harmful inputs such
as fertilizers and pesticides for land. The rents cre-
ated by output quotas and acreage restrictions may
encourage resources to remain in agriculture which
would otherwise exit.
Conclusions
As noted in the introduction, this paper was moti-
vated by two questions. First, do agricultural price
and income support policies promote a multifunc-
tional agriculture in an effective manner? Second,
would policies targeted more directly at multifunc-
tional attributes be more efficient than traditional
price and income support policies?
The answer to the first question appears to be
“No,” at least for agricultural policies targeted at
outputs (price supports, output subsidies, export
subsidies, import restrictions). Available evidence
on jointness indicates public goods associated with
agriculture are not joint with commodity production
per se, but rather with land use practices, agricul-
tural structures, and perhaps farm household labor.
The elasticity of supply of land to agriculture is
currently low, with the result that changes in
agricultural commodity outputs are accomplished
primarily through changes in purchased inputs
rather than changes in land. On the other hand,
negative externalities associated with agriculture are
joint with production to at least some degree. Nega-
tive externalities have worsened significantly in
several countries in recent decades as the intensity
of agricultural production has increased (OECD,
2001b). Further research is needed to examine how
the supply of land to agriculture might respond to
the large decreases in output prices which elimin-
ation of farm price and income support policies in
many countries would entail.
Available evidence in response to the second
question is sketchier. Agricultural price and income
support programs in developed countries carry high
consumer and taxpayer costs (OECD, 2002), and
encourage socially costly negative externalities
(Shortle, Abler, and Ribaudo, 2001; OECD, 1998).
However, they may economize on policy-related
transaction costs compared to more complicated
agri-environmental policies. It is relatively easy to
transfer funds to farmers based on acreage or pro-
duction, but more difficult to ensure that environ-
mental or land management conditions are followed
in return.
Clearly, the topics addressed here provide fertile
ground for future research. For example, extended
research needs to focus on (a) estimating policy-
related transaction costs, especially types of
transaction costs other than administrative costs;
(b) determining whether policy-related transaction
costs for agri-environmental programs could be
reduced through selective targeting of farms subject
to the programs; and (c) assessing whether any sav-
ings in transaction costs achieved by using agricul-
tural price and income support programs would be
sufficient to outweigh the social costs of these
programs due to market distortions and negative
externalities.
Agricultural policies targeted at land are a some-
what different case than policies targeted at
commodity outputs. Payments based on land area
encourage the supply of agricultural land and
perhaps the supply of public goods associated with
land, albeit to a limited degree because the elasticity
of supply of agricultural land is low. A useful area
of future research would be an examination of how
the supply of public goods associated with agri-
cultural land responds to payments based on land
area. Land payments can also encourage extensifi-
cation of agriculture in which land is substituted for
environmentally harmful inputs (fertilizers, pesti-
cides, irrigation water).
Compared to other forms of agricultural price
and income support, payments based on land area
carry lower social costs and lead to fewer distor-
tions in international trade (Dewbre, Antón, and
Thompson, 2001). Payments requiring the planting
of specific crops are more inefficient and trade dis-
torting than payments made irrespective of which
crops are grown, but these differences are smallAbler Multifunctionality, Agricultural Policy, and Environmental Policy   15
compared to the differences between land payments
and other forms of agricultural support (Dewbre,
Antón, and Thompson, 2001).
One important topic not addressed here is the
valuation of public goods provided by a multifunc-
tional agriculture. This is a major research challenge,
and the penalties for getting it wrong—under-
provision of public goods if valuations are too low,
or distortions in domestic and international agricul-
tural markets if valuations are too high—could be
significant (Randall, 2002; Lima e Santos, 2001).
Another important topic touched upon only briefly
in this article relates to possibilities for nonagri-
cultural provision of public goods—for example,
nonagricultural options for flood control, scenic
landscapes, or rural economic development (OECD,
2001a; Meister, 2001). One research question here
is whether agricultural or nonagricultural provision
is more efficient, which hinges on the existence and
magnitude of economies of scope between agricul-
tural commodity outputs and public goods. Another
research question is whether some public goods
could be converted into private goods through
changes in property rights, encouraging the creation
of markets for these goods.
It seems clear that multifunctionality as the term
has been used by some of its proponents, in essence
as a euphemism for protectionism, is not a viable
concept. However, as an organizing principle for
thinking about agriculture’s role in modern soci-
eties, it can serve as a stimulus for research on the
nature and value of public goods and negative
externalities generated by agriculture, and for
research on public policies designed to best ensure
provision of public goods and minimization of neg-
ative externalities.
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